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THE FOX IS GUARDING THE HENHOUSE: ENHANCING
THE ROLE OF THE EPA IN FONSI DETERMINATIONS
PURSUANT TO NEPA
Wendy B. Davis*

I. INTRODUCTION
Federal agencies, which lack environmental expertise, and whose
mission is not environmental protection, should not have the power to
determine whether their proposed projects will harm the environment.
Agencies with environmental expertise, such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), should be involved in the environmental
assessment process. Foreseeable adverse environmental impact should
result in a judicial finding that any proposed action pursuant to an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is arbitrary and capricious.
When enacted in 1969, The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)1 was to be “the most important and far-reaching conservationenvironmental measure ever acted upon by the Congress. . . . [It] is a
congressional declaration that we do not intend . . . to initiate actions
which endanger the continued existence or the health of mankind . . . .”2
Since its enactment, NEPA has proven to be little more than a
procedural hurdle, with no impact on the substantive outcome of
proposed federal projects.
Pursuant to NEPA, when a federal agency proposes a project that
may have a significant environmental impact, the proposing agency
becomes the lead agency, with authority to (a) determine whether any
significant environmental impact will result from the project, (b) draft
*
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School. The author is grateful to Albany Law
School for a research grant and to the following students of Albany Law School for excellent
research assistance: Willow Baer, Joshua Choi, and Scott Lukowski. The author also wishes to
express gratitude to Prof. Timothy Lytton of Albany Law School for insightful comments on an
early draft of this article.
1. Nat’l Envtl. Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-75 (1970).
2. 115 CONG. REC. 40,415, 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson).
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the EIS, and (c) determine the best alternatives to the project.3 Even if
this federal agency has no environmental expertise, the agency will have
authority to decide (a) whether the project will result in a major federal
action with a significant environmental impact so that an EIS is required,
(b) what other federal agencies, if any, may cooperate and assist in the
preparation of the EIS, and (c) whether to continue with the project
notwithstanding the disapproval of environmental experts or the
predicted adverse environmental impact.4
For example, if the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
proposes an airport expansion, the FAA, as lead agency, has the
authority to determine whether the project will have any significant
environmental impact. An Environmental Assessment (EA) will be
prepared to make this determination.5 If the FAA decides that its airport
expansion project will have no significant environmental impact, then
the NEPA process ends, unless this determination is challenged in court.
Thus, the federal agencies charged with protecting the environment and
our natural resources, such as the EPA, the National Forest Service, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the National Park Service
(NPS), would have no input and have no authority to approve or curtail
the proposed project. This hypothetical was taken from a 1996 Tenth
Circuit case, in which the Court found an FAA Finding of No
Significant Impact (FONSI) not arbitrary and capricious, although the
determination was made with no input from the EPA, FWS, or other
environmental experts.6
If the FAA determines that there may be a significant
environmental impact, the FAA can decide which, if any, other federal
agencies should be allowed to participate in the preparation of the EIS.7
Even with the participation of other agencies, the FAA may decide that
the concerns or objections of these cooperating agencies are less
important than the completion of the proposed project. The FAA may
proceed notwithstanding the protests of any other agency, and
notwithstanding any prediction of environmental harm, no matter how

3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2005). For a discussion of when an action is a federal action, see Enos
v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1985), where portions of a joint project between the
state of Hawaii and the Army Corps of Engineers were deemed not to be federal action, thus the
environmental effects of shoreside facilities funded by the state were held to be properly excluded
from the EIS.
4. 40 CFR §§ 1501.4 – 1506.
5. Id.
6. Airport Neighbor’s Alliance, Inc. v. United States, 90 F.3d 426, 433 (10th Cir. 1996).
7. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a).
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dire.8 Courts will defer to these decisions of the FAA, or any lead
agency, even if other agencies have expressed concerns, unless the court
finds their actions to be arbitrary or capricious.9 The judicial standard of
review is discussed in section II below.10
The final EIS is filed with the EPA.11 The EPA has authority to
review the EIS, and may refer issues to the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) if the EPA determines that the proposed action is
detrimental to public health, welfare, or environmental quality.12 The
EPA is not required to evaluate an EA or FONSI. The author suggests
that the EPA and other appropriate environmental protection agencies
should be more involved in the NEPA process, particularly in the EA
leading to FONSI determinations.13 If the EPA does not recommend the
proposed action, then the lead agency should be prohibited from taking
such action. The EPA should have authority to require preparation of an
EIS when a FONSI has been issued.
As noted by the Federal District Court of Minnesota, “NEPA does
not require, or even contemplate, that decision makers will be
completely impartial. In fact, NEPA assumes that institutional biases
will exist. . . .”14 These shortcomings of NEPA were noted and debated
in Congress at the time NEPA was enacted. During the Senate debates,
Senator Muskie stated:
The concept of self-policing by Federal agencies which pollute or
license pollution is contrary to the philosophy and intent of existing
environmental quality legislation. In hearing after hearing agencies of
the Federal Government have argued that their primary authorization,
whether it be maintenance of the navigable waters by the Corps of
Engineers or licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy
Commission, takes precedence over water quality requirements . . .

8. See Wendy B. Davis and Rebecca Clarke, Hot Air: Undue Judicial Deference to Federal
Aviation Administration Expertise in Assessing the Environmental Impacts of Aviation, 69 J. AIR L.
& COM. 709 (2004) (discussing the environmental harm caused by aviation and the failure of the
FAA to prevent such harm, and the deference by federal courts to such FAA decisions).
9. See, e.g., Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 398 F.3d
105, 114 (1st Cir. 2005).
10. See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA procedures).
11. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.9.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7609.
13. The process currently in place for compliance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (2005), may be an effective model for NEPA. The Act’s required
consultation with FWS experts, and the creation of the Endangered Species Committee pursuant to
16 U.S.C. § 1536, may serve as an example of a way to ensure knowledgeable environmental
evaluation. Further comparison is beyond the scope of this article.
14. Residents in Protest–I-35E v. Dole, 583 F. Supp. 653, 661 (D. Minn. 1984).
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The proposed compromise language developed for section 102 (c)
clearly indicates the extent to which the polluter is involved in
determining environmental effects. This language eliminated the
requirement that a “finding” be made but provides that environmental
impact be discussed as a part of any report on legislation, or any
decision to commence a major activity. The requirement that
established environmental agencies be consulted and that their
comments accompany any such report would place the environmental
control responsibility where it should be.15

The EPA, an “established environmental agency,” as described by
Senator Muskie, should have concurrent or dual authority with other
federal agencies regarding implementation of actions affecting the
environment pursuant to NEPA. At a minimum, the EPA should be
required to approve any FONSI. This suggestion may require an
amendment to the NEPA statute,16 or could be implemented by judicial
action. EPA involvement in this manner is not without precedent; in the
2003 Fifth Circuit case of Spiller v. White, the EPA and Department of
Transportation acted as co-lead agencies.17 The author suggests that this
type of dual authority by the EPA with other lead agencies should be
required, at least at the stage of preparing an EA that may lead to a
FONSI.18
As an alternative to amending the statute, a similar result could be
achieved if courts were more willing to find agency decisions made
without appropriate environmental expertise to be arbitrary and
capricious. The party challenging agency action must prove that the
agency decision was “arbitrary and capricious.”19 This standard of high
deference to agency determinations was set forth in the leading case of
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.20 In
Chevron, the Court considered a review of an EPA order pursuant to the
15. 115 CONG. REC. S-29052-53 (Oct. 8, 1969) (Emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
16. The federal legislature has authority to delegate rulemaking, enforcement, investigatory,
and other powers to federal agencies. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979). The
regulatory power of agencies is limited to the express grant of authority in an authorizing or
empowering statute, and therefore an amendment to NEPA would be required to implement these
suggestions. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Sweet v. Sheehan, 235
F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2000); Nagahi v. INS, 219 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2000).
17. Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2003).
18. See generally, Patricia E. Salkin, Integrating Local Waterfront Revitalization Planning
into Local Comprehensive Planning and Zoning, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 207 (2005) (discussing
the need for coordination between state and local government to enhance development of waterfront
projects while preserving coastal resources).
19. See Welch v. U.S. Air Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 797, 810 (N.D. Tex. 2003), vacated by
Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass’n v. FAA, 116 F. App’x 3, 7, 10 (5th Cir. 2004).
20. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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Clean Air Act.21 The Court upheld the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean
Air Act, stating “considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer. . . .”22 It is important to note that Chevron involved an
interpretation of a statute, the Clean Air Act by the EPA, the sole agency
charged with administering the statute. Under current law, FONSI
determinations, and decisions made pursuant to a NEPA EIS are not
decisions made by the EPA as the sole agency charged with
administration of NEPA. FONSI determinations are decisions made by
diverse lead agencies with missions that may be contrary to the goals of
NEPA. Hence, Chevron deference is not appropriate in NEPA cases and,
in fact, Chevron is rarely cited in NEPA suits.23
The D.C. District Court has been willing to acknowledge a reduced
standard of deference. In Hammond v. Norton,24 the D.C. District stated
that it does not “owe any deference to [the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM)’s] interpretation of NEPA or CEQ regulations because NEPA is
addressed to all federal agencies and Congress did not entrust
administration of NEPA to the BLM alone.”25 Because a FONSI
determination requires an interpretation of NEPA, other courts should be
more willing to grant less deference to lead agencies that lack
environmental expertise. A lesser degree of judicial deference may be
sufficient to alleviate the problem without overburdening the EPA or
increasing the bureaucracy.
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Chevron, courts continue to
accord significant deference to lead agency determinations, upholding
these decisions unless they are proven to be arbitrary and capricious.
This deference is not appropriate because the FAA, the Department of
Transportation, and other lead agencies are not experts in environmental
protection or preservation, and may have a mission that is contrary to
these goals. The lead agency is not required to obtain the approval of
the EPA, the FWS, or other appropriate federal or state environmental
experts in making these decisions. Any decision made by a lead agency
that is contrary to the advice of the EPA should be deemed arbitrary and
capricious by the courts.

21. Id. at 840.
22. Id. at 844.
23. See generally, Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005) (suggesting the cost-benefit analysis should be
rejected in environmental issues in favor of a trumping approach).
24. Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 239 (D.D.C. 2005).
25. Id. at 239.
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This article suggests an enhanced role for the EPA and the other
agencies that have authority to protect our natural resources, including
the FWS, NPS, and others. These agencies should have authority to
evaluate the environmental assessments leading to a FONSI and require
preparation of an EIS pursuant to NEPA.26 This paper also suggests that
these agencies need more authority in the substantive decision of choice
of an alternative action pursuant to the EIS, and the determination of
whether the proposed action should proceed based on the conclusions in
the EIS. This could be accomplished with an amendment to the statute;
however, the Author acknowledges that this would necessitate an
increase in the EPA budget and potentially significantly more
bureaucratic time and effort for construction projects. It should be noted
that the current NEPA procedure may be less cost efficient than the
Author’s suggestion. Centralization of such environmental analysis in
the EPA is likely to result in significant cost savings, although the
budget would be shifted from other agencies to the EPA.
Other scholars who have suggested ways to make NEPA more
effective, such as monitoring and post-completion evaluation, have
grappled with these same problems.27 Another alternative would be for
courts to show less deference to non-environmental lead agencies, and
find that lead agency action that is contradictory to the recommendations
of the environmental agencies is arbitrary and capricious.
Environmental litigation involves policy issues that are appropriate
for courts to decide. Policymaking should not be restricted to the
legislature, but rather the enactment of NEPA and other environmental
protection statutes should encourage and guide courts in deciding
controversies with public policy implications. The courts and the
legislature should play complementary roles in environmental
protection.28
II. NEPA PROCEDURES
NEPA

requires

federal

agencies

proposing

major

actions

26. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
27. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 939-40 (2002) (suggesting
that follow-up monitoring of actual impacts, adaptive mitigation, and environmental management
systems would make NEPA more effective); see also Sinden, supra note 23.
28. See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional
Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000) (advocating for the tort system to play a complementary
role in policy making for gun control).
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significantly affecting the human environment to prepare an EIS.29
Agencies will first prepare an EA to determine whether an EIS is
required or whether a FONSI is appropriate.30 There are one hundred
times as many FONSIs issued as EISs, Federal agencies produce
approximately 500 EISs annually, and nearly 50,000 FONSIs, and the
ratio is increasing.31 This indicates that many agencies may be
underreporting environmental impact. 32
Once a FONSI determination has been made, the project may
proceed, unless challenged in court by an environmental group or
concerned citizens. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)33 provides
for judicial review of agency action. The Supreme Court set the standard
for deference to agency interpretations of the statutes administered by
those agencies in Chevron.34 In reviewing a FONSI determination,
courts differ on the standard of review. Some early courts applied a
“reasonableness” standard to the agency’s decision that no EIS was
required,35 asking whether the agency “reasonably concluded that the
project will have no significant adverse environmental consequences.”36
A court applying the reasonableness standard is more likely to disagree
with a FONSI and require an EIS.37 More recently, following the
Supreme Court decision in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
Council,38 most Federal Courts of Appeals, including the D.C., First,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts,
have set aside the determination only if it was “arbitrary and
capricious.”39 The Eighth Circuit still applies a “reasonableness”
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1972).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c), 1501.3 (2004).
31. Id. at 920.
32. Karkkainen, supra note 27, at 909-910.
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2000).
34. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
35. Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Ass’n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 727 (9th Cir.
1995).
36. See California v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 260 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(citation omitted).
37. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1542 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
38. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (applying an “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review).
39. Town of Cave Creek, Ariz. v. FAA, 325 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Pearson v.
Powell, 96 F. App’x 466, 467 (9th Cir. 2004); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1330
(9th Cir. 1992); Citizens for Mobility v. Mineta, 119 F. App’x 882, 883 (9th Cir. 2004); Alliance to
Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 398 F.3d 105, 114 (1st Cir. 2005); Soc’y
Hill Tower Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2000); Spiller v. White, 352
F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2003); Friends of the Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin., 61 F.3d 501,
506 (6th Cir. 1995); River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of U.S. Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449
(7th Cir. 1985); Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc. v. United States, 90 F.3d 426, 429 (10th Cir.
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standard.40
The D.C. Circuit has further explained its analysis of the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard, as applied to a FONSI:
First, the agency has accurately identified the relevant environmental
concern. Second, once the agency has accurately identified the
problem, it must have taken a ‘hard look’ at the problem in preparing
the EA. Third, if a finding of no significant impact is made, the agency
must be able to make a convincing case for its finding. Last, if the
agency does find an impact of true significance, preparation of an EIS
can be avoided only if the agency finds that the changes or safeguards
in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.41

A 2003 Fifth Circuit case, Spiller v. White, provides an example of
EPA involvement in a FONSI determination.42 Spiller involved a
gasoline pipeline that had the potential to move 225,000 barrels of
gasoline per day across Texas.43 The pipeline had been used to transport
crude oil, but had not been used for several years.44 The EPA and the
Department of Transportation, acting as co-lead agencies, completed an
EA and issued a FONSI.45 The Fifth Circuit found the FONSI was not
arbitrary and capricious, because the EA was comprised of over 2,400
pages, including expert analysis on pipeline safety, endangered species,
emergency, response, and other matters.46 The EA incorporated a review
of over 6,000 written comments from six public meetings, and the court
found it was “more akin to a full-blown EIS.”47 The FONSI was also
predicated on the owner of the pipeline agreeing to mitigation measures
to reduce the potential of adverse environmental impact, referred to by

1996). N. Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990). Although the
Ninth Circuit courts used a “reasonableness” standard in earlier decisions, more recent cases from
this jurisdiction have applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. Compare Duvall, 777 F. Supp.
at 1537 (applying a reasonableness standard) with Pearson, 96 F. App’x at 467 (applying an
arbitrary and capricious standard); see also Korey A. Nelson, Judicial Review of Agency Action
Under the National Environmental Policy Act: We Can’t See the Forest Because There are Too
Many Trees, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 177, 189 (2003). For a discussion of the rule that a reviewing
court may look outside of the administrative record in NEPA cases, see Susannah T. French,
Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1993).
40. Goos v. ICC, 911 F.2d 1283, 1291 (8th Cir. 1990).
41. Town of Cave Creek, 325 F.3d at 327 (quoting Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 753 F.2d
120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
42. Spiller, 352 F.3d at 239.
43. Id. at 238.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 239.
46. Id. at 240.
47. Id. at 240-41.
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the Court as a “mitigated FONSI.”48 The author suggests that this type of
thoughtful analysis and expert consideration should take place before
any FONSI is issued.
The author is not suggesting that mitigated FONSIs are an
alternative solution to EPA involvement. Problems with mitigated
FONSIs arise when the lead agency suggests mitigation measures that
may be sufficient to keep the predicted environmental harm below the
level of a “significant environmental impact,” thus avoiding the need for
an EIS.49 Because of the lack of environmental expertise of the lead
agency, such predictions are rarely accurate.50 The involvement of the
EPA in drafting an EIS may result in more accurate predictions.
Mitigated FONSIs lack the analysis of the full range of environmental
impact, as well as the possible alternatives that would be detailed in an
EIS. Another problem is that the mitigation measures may never be
implemented, as NEPA does not require follow-up monitoring.
At a minimum, the EPA should be required to sign off on a FONSI
determination, because (a) it is a waste of the resources of our court
system to require a judgment to force the agency to prepare an EIS; (b) it
is inefficient to expect non-profit environmental citizens groups to bring
lawsuits to challenge a FONSI;51 (c) challenges to a FONSI may be
unsuccessful because of requirements of standing and timeliness; and (d)
the results of NEPA court challenges are currently politically motivated.
The inefficiency of relying on private lawsuits to protect the
environment was recognized decades ago, when the legislature enacted
environmental laws to replace common law nuisance claims.52 This
section discusses why EPA approval of FONSI determinations will be
more effective than reliance on lawsuits by environmental groups for
protection of the environment. Private lawsuits are less effective because
issues of standing, mootness, and laches may bar these challenges, and
48. Id. at 241.
49. Bradley C. Karkkainen Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLM. L. REV. 903, 908 (indicating that mitigated
FONSIs are just another method used to avoid drafting an EIS, and suggesting increased monitoring
of environmental harm post-EIS, a suggestion which this author strongly supports, notwithstanding
the inevitable increase in costs and bureaucracy).
50. Id. at 928, (stating that “fewer than one out of three verifiable predictions correctly
forecast both the direction and the approximate magnitude of the environmental impact, while most
predictions were simply unverifiable, either through fundamental imprecision or for lack of follow
up data”).
51. See generally, Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 106 (2005) (outlining
advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement).
52. See id. at 104.
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the lack of expertise in preparation of EIS may still be a problem,
notwithstanding private legal challenges.
A. Standing to Challenge NEPA Determinations
NEPA confers no private right of action. Therefore, plaintiffs
challenging a FONSI or the sufficiency of an EIS must prove they have
standing.53 An environmental group must “demonstrate that its interests
fall within the ‘zone of interests’ protected by NEPA,” to satisfy the
prudential standing requirement.54 Additionally, the plaintiff must meet
the constitutional standing requirements by proving
(1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.55

In 1990, the Supreme Court held that an environmental advocacy
group lacked standing in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation.56 In
Lujan, the BLM administered a program that determined which federal
lands would be available for commercial uses, including mining.57
Justice Scalia found no standing to permit review of an entire federal
agency program.58 Justice Scalia further restricted his view of standing
two years later in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, finding an
environmental group lacked standing because they failed to prove they
suffered an injury.59 The court found no imminent injury where members
of the environmental group hoped to be able to return to observe
endangered species, because the expected harm to such species was
merely speculative.60
53. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1236 (D. Wyo. 2005);
Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1996).
54. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 859 (9th Cir. 2005).
55. Id.
56. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990).
57. Id. at 885-90.
58. Id. at 889.
59. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
60. Id. at 564; see also Matthew Porterfield, Agency Action, Finality and Geographical
Nexus: Judicial Review of Agency Compliance with NEPA’s Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement Requirement After Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 619, 61920 (1994) (discussing the uncertainty over the implications of Lujan). The Court took a somewhat
broader view of standing in Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 528 U. S. 167,
173 (2000). However, that case involved the Clean Water Act, and has not been extended to NEPA
actions.
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The Ninth Circuit similarly found a lack of actual injury in Cold
Mountain v. Garber.61 The U.S. Forest Service issued a FONSI related
to a permit, granted to the Montana Department of Livestock, allowing it
to operate a bison-testing facility in the Gallatin National Forest, near
Yellowstone National Park.62 The purpose of the facility was to ensure
that bison migrating out of Yellowstone did not carry brucellosis, a
bacterial organism.63 The FWS issued an Incidental Take Statement,
anticipating that the facility might cause the reproductive failure of a
particular nest of bald eagles, a threatened species.64 When a second nest
of bald eagles failed, environmental groups brought an action alleging
NEPA violations and a failure to conform to the limitations of the
permit.65 The Court found that the plaintiff “failed to establish a causal
link between any alleged hazing violations and the [second] nest
failure.”66 Involving more environmental expertise in the early stages of
a FONSI would alleviate this problem of requiring an actual injury to
provide the plaintiff standing.67
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar result in Heide v. FAA.68
Petitioners attempted to challenge a FONSI issued by the FAA
approving runway procedures near the petitioners’ homes.69 Because the
petitioners lived east of the airport, and the record indicated that this area
would not be impacted by the proposed runway procedures, the court
found the petitioners had not demonstrated a particular injury and lacked
standing.70 This need to prove a causal link between the agency’s
actions and the environmental harm is one more hurdle for the
environmental groups challenging NEPA violations. The early
involvement of environmental experts in FONSI determinations would
address this, because environmental advocate suits would be a less
critical environmental protection tool if FONSIs were issued only with
environmental expertise.
Another element of standing that must be established by the
plaintiff is that the agency has taken final action.71 When the state of

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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Wyoming challenged the Department of the Interior’s approval of the
state’s plan for management of the re-introduction of the gray wolf, the
court found the state had no standing because the defendant’s letter was
not a final agency action.72
The NEPA standing requirement contradicts congressional intent
and creates an unnecessarily complicated hurdle to environmental
protection enforcement. A better policy would be to grant standing to
plaintiffs who can prove that they lack the information that NEPA
requires agencies to provide to the public.73
B. Finding of No Significant Impact: Challenged Too Late.
Environmental groups who attempt to challenge FONSI
determinations must act promptly. If the proposed project is completed
before the challengers file suit, courts are likely to dismiss the challenge,
notwithstanding a failure to comply with NEPA. Earlier courts often
refused to find a controversy moot, but more recent courts have been
more likely to consider a matter beyond review.74 One troubling
example, Bayou Liberty Assoc. v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, involved the construction of a Wal-Mart, Sam’s Club, and
Home Depot complex on 60 acres of wetlands in Louisiana.75 The entire
complex was located in a 100-year flood plain.76 The Army Corps of
Engineers issued a permit for construction after a FONSI.77 Although the
court noted that federal, state, and local agencies participated, there was
no indication of EPA or FWS approval or agreement.78 There can be
little doubt that paving 60 acres of wetlands would have significant
environmental impact on water quality and quantity, as well as wildlife
habitat.79 Because the environmental group only challenged the Corps’
72. Id.
73. See Adrienne Smith, Standing and the National Environmental Policy Act: Where
Substance, Procedure, and Information Collide, 85 B. U. L. REV. 633, 638 (2005) (advocating for a
theory that an agency harms individual plaintiffs when such plaintiffs are deprived of information
that NEPA requires agencies to make public, and therefore such plaintiffs have standing).
74. See, e.g., Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass’n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 591 (9th
Cir. 1981) (rejecting a mootness challenge); West v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920,
925 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a challenge to a completed phase of a freeway interchange project was
not moot because the project could be modified to reduce environmental impact).
75. Bayou Liberty Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 217 F.3d 393, 395-96 (5th Cir.
2000).
76. Reply Brief of Appellant at 7, Bayou Liberty Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
No. 98-31260 (5th Cir. June 2, 1999).
77. Bayou Liberty, 217 F.3d at 395.
78. Id.
79. For a discussion of the ramifications of paving large areas and increasing the rate of

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss1/3

12

Davis: EPA's Role in FONSI Determinations
DAVIS1.DOC

2006]

3/20/2006 9:15:48 AM

EPA’S ROLE IN FONSI DETERMINATIONS

47

NEPA process after construction of the retail complex was complete, the
court found its claims moot and denied relief.80
Similar to the Bayou Liberty result, the Fifth Circuit declared a
FONSI challenge moot because construction was complete in Springer
v. U.S. Marshal.81 A 300-inmate prison was constructed in Texas, at a
cost of three million dollars, after a brief environmental assessment and
FONSI determination, with no EIS.82 When the mayor of the city in
which the prison was located brought an action, challenging the
environmental assessment as being in bad faith and inadequate, the court
held the case was moot because “when a construction project is
complete and operating, plaintiffs can obtain no meaningful judicial
relief based on alleged non-compliance with NEPA . . . .”83
The Eighth Circuit recently adhered to the decisions in Bayou
Liberty and Springer, finding a FONSI challenge moot in One Thousand
Friends of Iowa v. Mineta.84 The Federal Highway Administration
reviewed an environmental assessment prepared by the city of West Des
Moines and the Iowa Department of Transportation regarding proposed
alterations to a highway interchange.85 Although three sections of the
interchange were intended to be relocated, the EA only included two.86
There was no indication that the EPA or any other environmental experts
were involved in the FONSI. The plaintiffs (an environmental group)
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a temporary restraining order. When
they appealed the decision, the Eighth Circuit found the challenge moot,
because the proposed action had been completed.87 The court
admonished the plaintiffs, stating that they could have “avoided this
result by seeking a stay pending this appeal.”88 The Ninth Circuit has
also found FONSI challenges moot where construction was completed.89
The Tenth Circuit’s approach has been more environmentally
friendly, refusing to find a challenge moot if the court can provide a
runoff, see Wendy B. Davis, Reasonable Use has Become the Common Enemy: An Overview of the
Standards Applied to Diffused Surface Water and the Resulting Depletion of Aquifers, 9 ALB. L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1, 4-5 (2004).
80. Bayou Liberty, 217 F.3d at 396.
81. Springer v. U.S. Marshal, 137 F. App’x. 657, 659 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Richland Park
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 941-92 (5th Cir. 1982).
82. Springer, 137 F. App’x. at 658.
83. Id.
84. One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. Mineta, 364 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2004).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 893.
88. Id. at 894.
89. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1978).
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remedy for failure to comply with NEPA.90 Where an airport runway
had already been expanded pursuant to an FAA FONSI, the Tenth
Circuit Court did not find the challenge moot because the court “could
order that the runway be closed or impose restrictions on its use until
Respondents complied with NEPA.”91 Similarly, in an earlier case, the
Ninth Circuit found that, because of the availability of the remedy of
“undoing” the agency’s sale of an airport, the challenge was not moot.92
While the above-mentioned courts have found FONSI challenges
moot, other courts have denied relief based on statutory deadlines or the
doctrine of laches.93 In Heide v. FAA, the Eighth Circuit recently found
a petition to review an FAA approval of runway procedures based on a
FONSI to be untimely.94 Petitioners alleged that that they did not
become aware of the FAA approval until twelve years after the fact. The
court found their claim was barred by a sixty-day deadline for petitions
for review pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (a).95 A contrary conclusion
was recently reached by the Ninth Circuit in Ocean Advocates v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, where the court refused to bar the
action because of laches, finding that the defendant was not able to
prove a lack of diligence.96 The Court noted that “[l]aches is strongly
disfavored in environmental cases,” because the “plaintiff will not be the
only victim of possible environmental damage.”97 To succeed in a laches
defense, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff lacked diligence in
pursuing the claim, and that such lack of diligence prejudiced the
defendant.98 Because new species were added to the threatened species
lists during the time the permit was being considered, and because the
defendant had sent letters to the plaintiff indicating that administrative
remedies might be available, the court found no lack of diligence.99
Many of these FONSI determinations are made by lead agencies
without environmental expertise, and the environmental groups that
attempt to challenge the decisions are thwarted by a failure to act with
90. Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc. v. United States, 90 F.3d 426, 428-29 (10th Cir. 1996).
91. Id. at 429; see also National Parks and Conservation Ass’n v. FAA, 998 F.2d 1523, 1524
n.3 (10th Cir. 1993).
92. Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1980).
93. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 549 F.2d 1021, 1026-29 (5th Cir.
1977); Sworob v. Harris, 451 F. Supp. 96, 101-102 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3d
Cir. 1978).
94. Heide v. FAA, 110 F. App’x 724, 725 (8th Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision).
95. Id.
96. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 862 (9th Cir. 2004).
97. Id.; accord City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 678 (9th Cir. 1975).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 862-63.
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sufficient promptness to stop the projects. Reliance on environmental
groups to prevent environmental harm is not effective because these
challenges may be deemed moot or barred by laches. Prevention of
environmental damage would be more certain if the EPA were
consistently involved in the environmental assessment process before a
FONSI is issued.
C. Finding of No Significant Impact: Determination Made Without
Environmental Expertise.
NEPA currently allows agencies to determine that their proposed
projects will have no significant environmental impact without involving
any environmental experts.
For example, the Federal Transit
Administration and Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Agency
issued a FONSI for the construction of a tunnel in Downtown Seattle to
be used by buses and trains.100 The court found the FONSI was not
arbitrary and capricious, even though there was no evidence that
environmental experts were involved in the determination.101
The D.C. Circuit denied a petition to review an FAA FONSI in
Town of Cave Creek, Arizona v. FAA.102 The FAA used its own
methodology to study the noise impact of changes to arrival and
departure routes at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport.103
Although the Court noted that the FAA “solicited comments from the
general public and federal, state, and local agencies,”104 there was no
evidence that the EPA or any other environmental agency was granted
cooperating agency status, or participated in any meaningful way.
Allowing the lead agency that is promoting the project to determine
environmental risks is like allowing the fox to guard the henhouse.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in North Carolina v. FAA, held that
FAA action was not arbitrary and capricious where the FAA adopted the
U.S. Navy’s environmental assessment and issued a FONSI,
notwithstanding the suggestions of the FWS that an EIS be prepared.105
The action involved establishing restricted air space for practice
bombing by the Navy on the North Carolina coast.106 The Court upheld
the FAA FONSI even though numerous environmental groups and
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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agencies indicated environmental concerns. The Fourth Circuit stated,
“[a]n agency establishing a rule need not respond to every comment.”107
In California v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, the FWS had also
requested that an EIS be prepared. The FAA refused to complete an
EIS, and instead issued a FONSI; however, unlike the Fourth Circuit in
North Carolina v. FAA, the Northern District of California found the
environmental assessment inadequate.108 In California v. U.S.
Department of Transportation, the Town of Mammoth Lakes intended
to expand its municipal airport near Yosemite National Park.109 The
FAA adopted the environmental assessment prepared by the town and
issued a FONSI.110 Not only did the FWS request an EIS, but numerous
other agencies and environmental groups, including the National Park
Service and California Department of Fish and Game, raised concerns
that were ignored by the environmental assessment.111 The Court found
that the FAA “unreasonably failed to prepare an EIS” and its
“conclusion that the project would have no significant impact on
endangered or threatened species strains credulity.”112 A required signoff by the FWS or EPA would have prevented this lawsuit by requiring
the FAA to prepare an EIS, saving court time and expense.
The First Circuit found a FONSI was not arbitrary and capricious in
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. United States Department of
the Navy.113 The Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit to construct a
170 foot high data collection tower in Nantucket Sound, for the purpose
of evaluating a proposal to build a wind energy plant.114 The Corps has
authority to “prevent obstruction to navigation in the navigable waters of
the United States . . . .”115 The Corps is charged with issuing certain
permits only after determining that proposed actions will cause only
107. Id. at 1135.
108. California v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 260 F. Supp.2d 969, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
109. Id. at 970-71.
110. Id. at 971.
111. Id. at 972-73.
112. Id. at 974, 978. For a similar case where an FAA FONSI was criticized by a court, see
Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The FAA issued a FONSI,
deciding that the construction of a replacement airport near Zion National Park, notwithstanding
that the plaintiff’s experts alleged that commercial jet overflights of the Park would result in noise
“4 to 23 times as loud as the natural soundscape.” Id. at 345. The FAA’s experts indicated that “4 to
15% of visitors. . .would be annoyed by the aircraft” noise. Id. at 344. The Court remanded the case,
requiring the FAA to evaluate the cumulative noise impact taking into account the data collected by
the NPS. Id. at 347.
113. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 398 F.3d 105, 108,
115-16 (1st Cir. 2005).
114. Nantucket Sound, 398 F.3d at 107.
115. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (e), (f) (1953).
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“minimal adverse environmental effects;”116 however, the Corps is not
an environmental protection agency, and its primary purpose is not
preservation of the environment or natural resources. The Corps
completed an EA and issued a FONSI, without approval or formal
consultation with the EPA or FWS. The court noted there was a public
comment period, and the Corps conferred with federal and state
environmental agencies.117 For a project of this scope, a FONSI does not
appear rational, yet the First Circuit found it was not arbitrary and
capricious.118
In another recent case involving an Army Corps of Engineers’
FONSI, Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the
Ninth Circuit found an EIS was required.119 The FWS had expressed
concerns about the risk of oil spills caused by an oil refinery in Puget
Sound.120 The Court found that the Corps’ reasons for the FONSI were
inadequate, where no reasons were stated.121 Once again, a requirement
of FWS or EPA approval of a FONSI would have prevented this waste
of court time.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit recently upheld a FONSI
determination in Pearson v. Powell.122 Where the U.S. Forest Service
prepared a biological assessment that determined that a construction
project would have no effect on an endangered or threatened species, the
Court found its FONSI was not arbitrary or capricious.123 The U.S.
Forest Service was not required to consult with the FWS.124 In Pearson,
the Forest Service had informally consulted and obtained a letter from
FWS. These determinations are particularly troubling because, unless an
environmental group challenges the FONSI determination promptly in
court, the project may reach a stage where a court will not enjoin the
action.125
Lead agencies have attempted to circumvent the requirement to
prepare an EIS by segmenting the project, so that each section is deemed
to have no significant environmental impact. This method was used by

116. 43 U.S.C. § 1344.
117. Id. at 115.
118. Id. at 115-16.
119. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 875 (9th Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 855.
121. Id. at 866.
122. Pearson v. Powell, 96 F. App’x 466, 467 (9th Cir. 2004).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (discussing issues of mootness and defense
of laches).
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the BLM in Hammond v. Norton.126 The BLM was considering a
pipeline project but analysis of a connected pipeline was omitted from
the EIS.127 By segmenting the project, the cumulative impact was not
disclosed. The Court found the BLM decision to segment the project to
be arbitrary. 128 The decision of the BLM was contrary to the
recommendations of the EPA; the EPA “objected to the DEIS . . .
and . . . raised the issue of ‘segmentation’ . . . .”129 If NEPA were
modified to require all lead agencies to address EPA objections, this
lawsuit would have been prevented.
The foregoing cases illustrate the inefficiencies and waste of court
time that have resulted when lead agencies ignore the objections of the
EPA or FWS, requiring judicial action to force the lead agency to avoid
environmental harm. If the EPA were given more authority in the
environmental assessment process, prior to issuance of a FONSI or prior
to finalization of the EIS, such judicial intervention would be
unnecessary.
D. Environmental Impact Statement Preparation and Sufficiency
The EPA and other environmental agencies should play an
increased role in the preparation of the EIS. NEPA requires the
preparation of an EIS when the facts alleged, if true, “show that the
proposed project would materially degrade any aspect of environmental
quality.”130 The EIS must include a discussion of the environmental
impact of the proposed action and any reasonable alternative actions.131
The lead agency preparing the EIS must
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has
jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved . . . . [S]uch statement and the
comments . . . shall be made available to the President, the Council on
Environmental Quality, and to the public. . . .132

126. Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244 (D.D.C. 2005).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 245.
129. Id. at 235; see also City of Buffalo v. N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 707 N.Y.S.2d
606, 613-14 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (finding a state agency had improperly segmented a project and
therefore a finding of no significant impact under state environmental statute was arbitrary and
capricious).
130. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i), (iii) (2005).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (2005).
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Mandating consultation and comments is not the same as requiring
approval. Many projects proceed over the protests of the EPA and other
environmental agencies,133 and many times consultation is never
requested because the lead agency determines that no significant
environmental impact is likely.134 Although the EPA has some authority
to review the final EIS and refer concerns to the CEQ,135 other
environmental agencies lack such authority. More importantly, this final
review authority is limited to the information contained in the EIS,
including the data and analysis prepared by the lead agency.
Environmental experts may differ on a lead agency’s analysis, testing
procedures, and data gathering methods; therefore it is important for
environmental experts to be involved earlier in the EIS preparation
process.
The EIS may be drafted by an agency that has neither
environmental expertise, nor an incentive to evaluate environmental
impact with any greater concern than economic benefits. Even a
contractor hired to construct a project has been deemed an appropriate
party to draft an EIS.136 An appraiser of the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development was deemed to be an appropriate person to
prepare an environmental assessment and make a FONSI determination
for a proposed low income apartment project.137 The Navy prepared an
EIS proposing sonar testing, which has been proven to cause whales and
marine mammals to die by beaching themselves, without any reasonable
alternatives included in the EIS.138 This bias and lack of environmental
expertise is an obvious detriment to a meaningful environmental
assessment.
In addition to a lack of environmental expertise in the lead agency,
another problem with the drafting of the EIS is the use of professional
133. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Center
for Biological Diversity v. Fed. Highway Admin., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2003);
North Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding the FAA FONSI despite a
suggestion by the FWS that an EIS should be prepared).
134. See, e.g., One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. Mineta, 364 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2004);
Citizens for Mobility v. Mineta, 119 F. App’x 882, 883 (9th Cir. 2004); Bayou Liberty Ass’n, Inc.
v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 217 F.3d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 2000).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2005).
136. Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 686 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
137. Richland Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 938-39 (5th Cir. 1982).
138. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (N.D.Cal. 2003); see also
Julie G. Yap, Comment, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding Environmental Stewardship Out of the
Riptide of National Security, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1289, 1291 (2004) (discussing the balance
between national security issues and environmental harm).
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authors, where the lead agency hires a consultant for the purpose of
paper compliance. The hired expert may be more skilled in paper
compliance than in the management and mitigation of harm to the
environment. It is not reasonable to expect a hired contractor to
undermine the desires of its employer by emphasizing adverse
environmental harm or criticizing the proposed project.139
The EIS must consider all foreseeable direct and indirect effects,
and the consideration given must amount to a “hard look” at the
environmental effects.140 NEPA has not been applied as a substantive
statute, and so long as the environmental damage is identified and
evaluated, the agency is not prohibited from deciding that its goals
outweigh the environmental costs.141 NEPA “prohibits uninformed—
rather than unwise—agency action.”142 While the EIS must consider
alternatives to the proposed action, it need not consider all of the
alternatives, only those that are reasonable in light of the stated purpose
of the project.143 Courts will defer to the decision of the lead agency,
requiring challengers to these determinations to prove that they were
arbitrary and capricious.144 In the leading case of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,145
the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “The role of a court in reviewing the
sufficiency of an agency’s consideration of environmental factors is a
limited one, limited both by the time at which the decision was made and
by the statute mandating review.”146
In the Vermont Yankee case, the Supreme Court upheld the decision
to license a nuclear reactor, although the hearing conducted in
preparation of the EIS did not address disposal of the 100 pounds of
hazardous waste that would be produced annually.147 The Supreme
Court overturned the Circuit Court of Appeals finding that the rejection
of energy conservation was arbitrary and capricious, holding that the
139. See Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away of the
National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVT’L L. 245
(2000).
140. See Communities Against Runway Expansion, 355 F.3d at 685.
141. See, e.g., Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1035-36 (10th Cir.
2001); see generally Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
142. Custer County Action Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 1034 (citations omitted).
143. See, e.g., Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, 69 F. App’x 617, 622 (4th Cir. 2003).
144. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir.
2002).
145. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
146. Id. at 555.
147. Id. at 538.
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agency’s decision must be upheld if the agency employed at least the
minimum procedures required by the statute.148 Justice Rehnquist
cautioned the Court against imposing “upon the agency its own notion of
which procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague,
undefined public good.”149
NEPA does not provide effective protection for the environment.150
It merely creates a procedural hurdle that wastes agency time and
resources, with no corresponding assurance that environmental harm
will be prevented. This problem is particularly apparent when airport
projects are involved. The FAA has been successful in convincing courts
that airline safety, convenience, and the prevention of commercial flight
delays are more important than any resulting damage to the
environment. Courts have accorded such a high degree of deference to
the FAA’s determinations that the environmental protection laws have
been rendered meaningless.151 Whether the goal of airport expansion is
to prevent delays in commercial flights152 or to provide training
opportunities for military pilots,153 courts support FAA decisions despite
significant environmental impact. For example, courts have upheld
FAA orders that (1) threatened significant disturbance of livestock or
migratory birds;154 (2) allowed hundreds of acres of wetlands to be filled

148. Id. at 548.
149. Id. at 549.
150. See generally, Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S.
Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 3, 5 (2006) (questioning “whether formally including environmental factors in
decision-making documents, but paying them no real heed, violates the ‘arbitrary and capricious’
standard of the APA”).
151. Petitioners are often denied a voice in court to review FAA orders, as when the Second
Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review FAA approval of an airport layout plan in
Comm. to Stop Airport Expansion v. FAA, 320 F.3d 285, 286-87 (2d Cir. 2003). The court found
that its jurisdiction was limited to the review of orders with respect to aviation safety duties, and
that the approval of an airport layout plan fell under a separate part of the statute that did not
specifically grant jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, leaving jurisdiction exclusively to the district
court. Id. at 287.
152. See Communities Against Runway Expansion v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 682 (2d Cir. 2004).
153. See Lee v. U. S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004).
154. Id. at 1244; see also Welch v. U.S. Air Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 797, 802 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
Welch held the FAA’s order sufficient to satisfy the NEPA requirements. Id. at 850. However, in a
consolidated appeal of three separate challenges to the FAA in this matter, the Fifth Circuit
abrogated portions of the Welch decision. Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass’n v. FAA,
116 F. App’x 3, 7, 10 (5th Cir. 2004). For example, the Fifth Circuit refused to overturn the lower
court’s determination that the EIS adequately considered the impact to livestock and birds, but held
the EIS inadequately addressed the economic impact of low-level Air Force flights on the
community. Id. at 10. The court required the FAA to further study and address this impact in a
supplemental EIS. Id. at 16.
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in;155 (3) created a noise level that was expected to cause some people to
be “highly annoyed;”156 and (4) increased the noise level at historic
national parks.157 NEPA would have more of a substantive impact if
courts gave less deference to the decisions of the FAA and other nonenvironmental lead agencies.
The Fifth Circuit has set forth three criteria to determine whether an
EIS is adequate:
(1) whether the agency in good faith objectively has taken a hard look
at the environmental consequences of a proposed action and
alternatives;
(2) whether the EIS provides detail sufficient to allow those who did
not participate in its preparation to understand and consider the
pertinent environmental influences involved; and
(3) whether the EIS explanation of alternatives is sufficient to permit a
reasoned choice among different courses of action.158

Even within the this deferential framework, courts should conclude
that the lead agency did not take a hard look at the environmental
consequences whenever the appropriate environmental experts were not
involved. Alternatively, Congress should amend NEPA to require that
environmental considerations take priority over concerns of mere
convenience or economy.159 This balancing of environmental and other
considerations has policy implications that could be addressed by both
the legislature and the courts.
President George W. Bush has sought to undermine even the
limited impact of NEPA by an executive order.160 The order
acknowledged the importance of transportation infrastructure projects
and created an Interagency Task Force within the Department of
Transportation to assist agencies in expediting environmental review and
streamlining the process of issuing permits.161 The order undermines the
NEPA requirement that agencies take a “hard look” at environmental
impacts. An expedited review is necessarily a more cursory review,
155. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. State, 80 P.3d 231, 235 (Alaska 2003).
156. See Welch, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 840.
157. See Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2001).
158. Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2000).
159. See generally Sinden, supra note 23 (suggesting the cost-benefit analysis should be
rejected in environmental issues in favor of a trumping approach).
160. Exec. Order No. 13,274, 67 Fed. Reg. 59,449 (Sept. 18, 2002).
161. Id.
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lacking in-depth analysis and reducing the likelihood of an accurate
prediction of impact. It is particularly damaging to the effectiveness of
NEPA considering that the Supreme Court has held that if a statutory
deadline for a project is too short for an agency to prepare an EIS, then
no EIS is required.162 The impact of this executive order has yet to be
realized, but the order, in effect, gives the FAA the opportunity to ignore
important environmental ramifications for the sake of mere convenience.
For NEPA to have any real effect, the EPA and other environmental
experts must be involved in both the EA and EIS preparation.
E. Supplementing the EIS
EPA involvement in supplementing an EIS would also render
NEPA more effective. Once a final EIS has been filed, additional
information may become available that changes some aspect of the
project. If “[t]he agency makes substantial changes in the proposed
action that are relevant to environmental concerns,” or if there are
“significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental
concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts,” a
Supplemental EIS (SEIS) must be filed.163 The agency is required to
supplement when “the subsequent information raises new concerns of
sufficient gravity such that another, formal in-depth look at the
environmental consequences of the proposed action is necessary.”164 If
the proposed agency action is implementation of a plan, once the plan is
in effect, there is no obligation to supplement the EIS because there is no
proposed action.165
As in deciding whether to prepare an EIS, the standard of review
for the decision to supplement the EIS is not consistent among the
courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “arbitrary and capricious”
is the appropriate standard of review, in Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council.166 In Marsh, the Army Corps of Engineers prepared
a final EIS, as well as a supplement, describing the impact of the Elk
Creek Dam on fishing, elk and deer populations, and water quality.167
After construction was one-third complete, environmental groups sought
162. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 777 (1976).
163. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (c) (1); see also Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
377 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004); Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2004).
164. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1237 (D. Wyo. 2005)
(quoting Wis. v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1984)).
165. Id. at 1238.
166. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1989).
167. Id. at 366.
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review of the failure to file a SEIS reflecting information that became
available at a later time, indicating the cumulative effects of three dams
in the Rogue River Basin.168 The Supreme Court decided that the Army
Corps was not arbitrary or capricious in deciding not to file a SEIS
because the new information was either not significant, or the portions
that were significant were not new or accurate.169 The Court also noted
that “the difference between the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ and
‘reasonableness’ standards is not of great pragmatic consequence.”170
The Court described its inquiry as a determination of whether “the
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors, and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment,” requiring the agency
to take a “hard look” at the new information to determine whether
supplementation was necessary.171 The Court noted that the First, Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted a reasonableness standard, while
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the arbitrary and capricious standard.172
Since the Marsh decision, several courts, including the Ninth Circuit,
have adopted an arbitrary and capricious standard for evaluating the
decision to supplement an EIS.173
When the BLM auctioned three oil and gas leases in the Wyoming
Powder River Basin to extract coal bed methane, relying on existing
EISs relating to conventional oil extraction, the Tenth Circuit reviewed
the decision using the arbitrary and capricious standard.174 The Court
explained that the agency action would be deemed arbitrary unless
supported by substantial evidence, defined as “such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”175
The Tenth Circuit found that there was substantial evidence that the
unique environmental concerns of coal bed methane development
rendered the existing EIS inadequate.176
In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the BLM was able
to avoid supplementing an EIS by proving that no ongoing major federal

168. Id. at 368.
169. Id. at 385.
170. Id. at 377 n.23 (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 378 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)).
172. Id. at 377 n.23.
173. See, e.g., Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2004).
174. Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 377 F.3d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 2004).
175. Id. (citation omitted).
176. Id. at 1159.; see generally Wendy B. Davis, Coalbed Methane: Degasification, Not
Ventilation, Should be Required, 2 APPALACHIAN J. L. 25 (2003) (discussing the environmental
issues in coalbed methane development).
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action was proposed.177 The environmental-group plaintiff alleged that
the BLM failed to manage the increased use of off-road vehicles in
wilderness areas where use had increased after the approval of a land use
plan.178 The U.S. Supreme Court found that the approval of the land use
plan was a major federal action; however, once the plan was approved,
there was no ongoing major federal action that would require a
supplement to the EIS.179 As a result, the polluter, and not the agencies
charged with protection of our natural resources and environment, has
the power to decide when to update or expand on an EIS. The Author
suggests that the EPA and other appropriate environmental protection
agencies should have more authority in these determinations.
F. History of NEPA Court Actions
Prior to the administration of President George W. Bush, the
decreased priority of environmental concern exhibited by the public and
environmental advocacy groups was evidenced by the decrease in the
number of EIS’s filed: from 1,949 in 1971 to only 513 in 1992.180 The
number of lawsuits related to NEPA decreased from 189 in 1974 to 81 in
1992.181 This trend was reversed during the first two years of the George
W. Bush administration, with 137 NEPA suits filed in 2001 and 150 in
2002.182 It appears that the lack of presidential concern for
environmental matters has caused a corresponding increase in the
activism of environmental groups and citizens.
G. Impact of the Political Affiliation of the Court
The political affiliation of the administration that appointed the
judge deciding the case affects the outcome of NEPA cases. Between
January 2001 and June 2004, there were 217 federal district court NEPA
cases, with environmental plaintiffs achieving success 59.2% of the time
when appearing before a Democrat appointed judge, and only 28.4% of

177.
178.
179.
180.

Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 2385 (2004).
Id. at 2377-78.
Id. at 2385.
See Dinah Bear, The National Environmental Policy Act: Its Origins and Evolutions, 10
NATURAL RES. & ENVIRONMENT 3, 71 (1995).
181. Id.
182. Jay E. Austin, John M. Carter II, Bradley D. Klein, Scott E. Schang, Judging NEPA: A
“Hard Look” at Judicial Decision Making Under the National Environmental Policy Act,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE at 6 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.endangeredlaws.org
/downloads/JudgingNEPA.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
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the time when appearing before a Republican appointed judge.183 During
the same period, only 107 NEPA cases were filed with the Circuit
Courts of Appeals.184 Environmental plaintiffs had a success rate of
35.3%; however “environmental NEPA plaintiffs were nearly six times
more likely to prevail before majority Democrat-appointed panels . . .
than before majority Republican-appointed panels.”185 It is also
significant to note that in every U.S. Supreme Court NEPA case found
by this Author, the Court upheld the decision of the federal agency and
decided against the environmental plaintiffs.186 This is likely due to the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard and the high level of deference
granted by the Court to agency decisions.
The administration and the courts should give greater priority to the
prevention of irreversible environmental harm, regardless of any
political party affiliation. An increased role in the NEPA process by the
EPA and other environmental agencies would make the process less
politically sensitive, by halting the process after EPA objection rather
than resorting to judicial intervention.
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 422 U.S. 289 (1975) (finding that the EIS prepared by the Interstate Commerce
Commission satisfied NEPA); Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776
(1976) (finding that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was not required to
prepare an EIS before filing a disclosure statement); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976)
(finding that a lead agency has broad discretion to determine when a proposal for action exists); Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (finding that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) complied with NEPA); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.
347 (1979) (finding that EIS was not required for appropriation requests by federal agencies);
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (finding the HUD’s
decision on location of low-income housing project was not a NEPA violation because
environmental factors may be outweighed by other factors); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Haw., 454 U.S. 139 (1981) (finding Navy was not required to prepare EIS); Metro. Edison Co. v.
People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) (finding that EIS did not need to address
psychological health); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87
(1983) (upholding NRC’s environmental analysis); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the government could permit timber harvesting in national
forest); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (finding that decision not to
supplement EIS was not arbitrary and capricious); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989) (finding mitigation measures in EIS were sufficient); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (holding that NEPA does not provide a private right of action.); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
ESA regulation); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (permitting timber sales
in old growth forests); Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998) (allowing
clear-cutting in National Forest, and finding case was not ripe for review); Norton v. S. Utah
Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (finding that no federal agency action was proposed
therefore no supplemental EIS was required).
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Of course, industry and modern commerce necessarily have a
negative impact on the environment and consume natural resources;
however, a minimization of that harm must become more of a political
priority. Global warming, extinction of species, and other dire
consequences will result unless the legislature, and the courts, give more
weight to environmental preservation.
III. NEPA COOPERATING AGENCIES
The EPA and other environmental agencies could have more
influence as cooperating agencies. In preparing an EIS pursuant to
NEPA, the lead agency proposing the action is required to invite the
participation of federal agencies, states, local governments, and Indian
tribes that the agency determines may be affected by the proposed
action.187 The lead agency is also required to assign preparation of
portions of the EIS to these cooperating agencies.188 The participation of
and delegation to these cooperating agencies must be meaningful. The
U.S. District Court of Wyoming has found a failure to comply with
NEPA where the U.S. Forest Service did not provide maps indicating the
affected areas to the State of Wyoming and other cooperating agencies
in a timely manner, thus preventing any meaningful participation.189
Notwithstanding the requirement that agencies be allowed to participate,
many cooperating agencies merely adopt the findings of the lead agency.
Such adoption is permitted, so long as the cooperating agency
undertakes “an independent review of the statement,” and determines
that the cooperating agency’s “comments and suggestions have been
satisfied.”190
This requirement of participation by cooperating agencies does not
ensure significant protection of the environment. The lead agency
proposing the action has the discretion to grant or deny cooperatingagency status.191 In addition, the lead agency is not required to give
weight to the recommendations or opinions of the cooperating agencies.
The lack of effect of the cooperating agency process is
demonstrated in a 2003 District Court of Wyoming case.192 The Court
187. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (a) (1) (2004); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d
1197, 1219 (D. Wyo. 2003).
188. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (a) (4), (6); Wyoming, 277 F. Supp 2d at 1219.
189. Wyoming, 277 F. Supp 2d at 1219.
190. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(c); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209,
1215 (11th Cir. 2002).
191. 40 C.F.R. 1508.5; Wyoming, 277 F. Supp 2d at 1221.
192. Wyoming, 277 F. Supp 2d at 1219.
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found that the National Park Service, as lead agency, acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in denying ten states the status of cooperating agency,
because the lead agency did not provide any reason for its decision.193 In
a later decision, this same court also found a lack of meaningful
participation where the cooperating agencies were not informed of the
lead agency’s decision regarding a preferred alternative action before
preparation of the EIS.194 The National Park Service, as lead agency, had
decided to ban snowmobiles in national parks, which the court found
was a “prejudged, political decision.”195
Where the Federal Highway Administration proposed to construct
an 11.2-mile toll road that “cuts across the habitat of many endangered
and threatened species” in San Diego County, the EPA as a cooperating
agency, expressly stated “we recommend you deny the permit.”196 The
EPA further noted
there has never been a comprehensive analysis of the number of local
interchanges needed by the three local entities . . . , nor a
comprehensive analysis of their proposed siting [sic] such that adverse
impacts to water of the United States can be avoided and minimized to
the fullest extent possible.197

Notwithstanding the concerns expressed by the EPA, the federal agency
with the most expertise in this area, the Southern District of California
Court found that the Federal Highway Administration’s EIS, which
recommended completion of the project notwithstanding these concerns,
contained a “reasonably thorough evaluation,” and therefore the project
was allowed to proceed.198 This is precisely the behavior that could be
prohibited if the EPA were given dual authority as lead agency, or more
of an approval role with veto power. If NEPA is to have any real effect
as an environmental statute, then the agencies with environmental
expertise must be given authority to prevent projects that will harm the
environment.199
Another example of ignoring the concerns of the EPA occurred
when the Secretary of the Interior prepared an EIS proposing the leasing
193. Id. at 1221.
194. Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1262 (D. Wyo. 2004).
195. Id.
196. Center for Biological Diversity v. Fed. Highway Admin, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182,
1187 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
197. Id. at 1187.
198. Id. at 1187-88.
199. See generally, Sinden, supra note 23.
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of the outer continental shelf for oil and gas deposits, although five
states and several environmental groups objected to the project.200 In an
opinion written in part by Circuit Judge (now Justice) Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, the Court found that the EIS failed to include an adequate
analysis of the cumulative impacts of the program on migratory salmon
and whales.201 Because the whales and salmon would have to swim
through different areas “with no respite from the harmful effects” of the
oil and gas drilling, the court found that the cumulative impacts required
further analysis, rather than the mere conclusory remarks in the EIS.202
The EPA had expressed serious concern to the Secretary over the lack of
cumulative impact considerations.203 If the EPA were given dual
authority, or the power to veto the proposed action, this lawsuit could
have been prevented and the court would not have been burdened with
this decision. The project would have been curtailed until the EPA was
satisfied. The court refused to review other portions of the EIS, finding
that the Secretary of the Interior’s EIS was adequate on other issues.204
In a recent case, the Air Force proposed to designate air space in
Texas for low-altitude maneuvers, including B-52 and B-1 Bomber
flight training. The FAA was designated as a cooperating agency, but
there was no evidence that the EPA, FWS, or any other environmental
agency was also designated.205 The FAA merely adopted the Air Force’s
EIS.206 A non-profit group of farmers and ranchers challenged the EIS,
alleging that the Air Force did not follow its own handbook in
determining the impact of low-altitude flights on livestock, and ignoring
the plaintiff’s experts’ opinions on the subject.207 The court deferred to
the Air Force’s determinations and discretion, even though the Air Force
data contained significant mistakes.208 The Air Force had mistakenly
referred to surface wind speeds generated by B-52 aircraft flying at 300
feet above the ground, relying on data from a Boeing aircraft study that
referred to surface winds from flights at 30,000 feet above the ground.209
Although the court remanded for a supplemental EIS on other grounds,
there was no mention of the need for, or reasonableness of, obtaining the
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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input of the FWS or EPA as to the noise or other impact on livestock.210
The lack of an environmental agency as a cooperating agency was
evident in the case of Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.211
The Federal Highway Administration was the lead agency for a project
to construct the Suncoast Parkway in Florida.212 The Army Corps of
Engineers was a cooperating agency, and several state and federal
groups participated in an “informal partnering process.”213 The U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service expressed concern that the project would impact
two listed species, the Florida scrub jay and the red-cockaded
woodpecker, but this agency determined that the project would not
impact the eastern indigo snake, another listed species.214 The Sierra
Club was concerned that the project would also impact the Florida
panther and three plant species, but the FWS determined, via an informal
consultation, that these species would not be adversely affected.215 The
court found that the Corps complied with the Endangered Species Act
and NEPA.216 The filling and dredging of wetlands can be predicted to
have a significant impact on local plants, animals, and ecosystems, and
the deference and authority granted to a highway department as lead
agency in developing an environmental plan is not appropriate.
Other cases have involved a failure to approve of the proposed
project by the EPA, as a cooperating or non-lead agency, where the lead
agency continued to forge ahead with the project and the court approved
the project notwithstanding the expressed concerns of the EPA.217 A
stronger role for the EPA as a cooperating agency would prevent these
results.
The Author acknowledges that participation of the EPA is not a
guaranty that all environmental damage will be prevented. The
participation of the EPA did not prevent potential environmental harm in
a 1982 Eleventh Circuit case.218 The EPA was a cooperating agency,
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as lead, in the
construction of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project in

210. Id. at 7
211. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2002).
212. Id. at 1216.
213. Id. at 1217.
214. Id. at 1218.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1223.
217. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 468, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Citizens Against Burlington,
Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 200, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226,
235 (D. D.C. 2005).
218. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Zeller, 688 F.2d 706, 708 (11th Cir. 1982).
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Tennessee.219 The EPA allowed the NRC to begin construction before
completion of the EIS, notwithstanding a known adverse impact on
endangered or threatened fish species.220 The Court found that NEPA
allowed the EPA to approve such preliminary site preparation before
completion of the EIS process, denying a preliminary injunction sought
by the Sierra Club and others.221 An enhanced role for the EPA will not
always curtail new projects, and does not guarantee that no additional
environmental harm will occur; however, such participation is likely to
have a beneficial impact on the environment.
IV. AUTHORITY OF LEGISLATURE TO DELEGATE DUAL AUTHORITY
Both Federal and State legislatures have the power to grant dual
authority to more than one agency. Therefore, Congress may revise
NEPA to grant dual authority to the EPA and the appropriate lead
agency.
A. Federal
Nothing in the U.S. Constitution requires that legislative authority
be delegated only to a single agency. An investigating agency may
cooperate and share information with other agencies.222 An example of
dual authority is where the administrators of the FAA and the EPA are
required to consult with one another before either approves a testing
procedure or process inconsistent with the emissions regulations
pertaining to air pollution caused by jet aircraft engines, and to
determine whether such action requires rulemaking.223 The EPA
currently has dual authority with OSHA for investigation of major
chemical accidents.224
Another example of dual authority is the cooperation among federal
agents in investigation of crimes. In a 1986 Southern District of
California case, many defendants were charged with narcotics-related
219. Id. at 712.
220. Id. at 712-13.
221. Id. at 711.
222. United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 831 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Notwithstanding this permissible cooperation, an agency may not be used as an information
gathering arm of another agency. United States v. Lasalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 (1978);
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 788 F.2d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 1986).
223. 14 C.F.R. § 34.3(a) (2004). See generally, Davis and Clarke, supra note 7.
224. Memorandum of Understanding Between EPA and OSHA on Chemical Accident
Prevention (Dec. 1996), available at Donald Stever, Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous
Waste, Appendix 7N, 7N-4 (2005).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3
DAVIS1.DOC

66

3/20/2006 9:15:48 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:35

offenses.225 Defendants filed “numerous motions to suppress evidence
derived from electronic surveillance.”226 The Court held that use of
agents from agencies other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to monitor communications was permissible, where the FBI was
given authority to intercept communications in orders.227
While cross-agency cooperation and sharing of federal resources are
commendable, the ease with which judicial review and approval of
joint monitoring can be obtained, along with the procedural precision
demanded in Title III, suggest that cross-agency monitoring based only
on cross-agency investigative cooperation not be viewed as the
‘normal’ procedure.228

The Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange
Commission were permitted by the D.C. Circuit to investigate possible
violations simultaneously, where the Court found such dual authority to
be required for effective law enforcement.229 In criminal investigations,
dual authority raises additional concerns; where Worker’s Compensation
Commission attorneys were appointed as assistant prosecutors in
criminal cases alleging fraud and abuse, the court required that those
attorneys must not be involved in the civil investigation process of the
agency, to prevent improper exchanges of information.230 These
concerns do not arise in civil cases, where exchanges of information can
lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness.
The EPA regulates food-safety issues arising from plants that have
been genetically modified to produce their own pesticide.231 The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) also addresses similar food-safety
issues for genetically modified plants, which could have resulted in
inefficient overlap of agency resources; however, the FDA has expressly
waived its authority in this area.232
The above examples indicate that dual authority between federal
225. U.S. v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1429 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1531.
228. Id. n.15.
229. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
230. West Virginia v. Angell, 609 S.E. 2d 887, 894 (W.Va. 2004).
231. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (bb) (providing that the potential beneficial or adverse effects of the
pesticide on human health and the environment must be included in the registration of such plants).
See generally, Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the
Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004).
232. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
23,004-05 (May 29, 1992).
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agencies is permitted and has been effective; nonetheless there are
admittedly potential problems such as inefficiency and wasted resources.
The benefits of an enhanced role of the EPA in NEPA far outweigh
these potential problems.
B. State
States have also considered the issues of dual agency authority. A
Wisconsin Court held in 1941 that a statute was not rendered uncertain,
even though two agencies were vested with the same power.
Notwithstanding that the court recognized that conflict or confusion may
result from a potential concurrent exercise of the power.233 The statute
involved the creation and re-definition of school districts.234 The court
noted that under the statute, any action by the school board would be
subject, and subordinate, to any conflicting order of the
superintendent.235 No conflict or confusion had arisen at that time;
therefore the issue was not before the court.236
Dual authority is also an issue in state environmental protection
statutes.237 After NEPA was enacted, twenty-eight jurisdictions adopted
their own version of environmental impact reporting statutes, sometimes
referred to as State Environmental Protection Acts or SEPAs.238 Similar
to NEPA, some state environmental statutes do not require approval of
state environmental agencies. Instead, they merely require that the
environmental agencies be allowed to comment. For example, in New
York, the state environmental agency is allowed to comment, but the
project may go forward notwithstanding the protests or lack of approval
of the environmental agency.239 Cooperating agencies that do not have
jurisdiction to fund, approve, or directly undertake the proposed action
have “the same ability to participate in the review process as a member
of the public.”240 An agency that has jurisdiction to fund, approve, or
directly undertake the action, defined as an “involved agenc[y],” may
impose substantive conditions following the filing of the final EIS by the
lead agency, if the conditions are “practicable and reasonably related to
233. School Dist. No. 3 of Town of Adams v. Callahan, 297 N.W. 407, 415 (Wis. 1941).
234. Id. at 411.
235. Id. at 415.
236. Id.
237. See Nicolas A. Robinson, SEQRA’s Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPAs in the Sister
States, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1155, 1157-58 (1982).
238. See Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing
Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 436 (2003); Robinson, supra note 237.
239. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.11(a).
240. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.2(t).
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impacts identified in the EIS or the conditioned negative declaration.”241
After these comments and conditions are received, the lead agency must
issue a written findings statement.242 Environmental plaintiffs may not
obtain judicial review of a proposed action until after the public hearing
on the draft EIS and the filing of the final EIS and written findings
statement.243 Where a neighborhood group argued that a draft EIS was
deficient, lacking critical analysis to such an extent that meaningful
comment at the public hearing before the findings statement would not
be possible, the court found the matter was not ripe for judicial
review.244 These procedural requirements can prevent effective review
and comment by environmental agencies and others, as it did in a case
regarding a New York City subway extension and development of the
Hudson Yards area.245
Under the New York statutory framework, it is possible for a
project to proceed, notwithstanding the protests of the environmental
protection agencies. For example, in 2004, a town in New York, acting
as lead agency, approved a subdivision proposal for the construction of
116 homes.246 The New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (NYDEC) requested an injunction because the project was
likely to kill or disturb tiger salamanders, a listed endangered species.247
Although the welfare of the species was considered during the
environmental review, the town decided to allow the subdivision
notwithstanding the potential harm.248 The court granted a permanent
injunction, finding that the NYDEC had authority to prevent any
activities within 1,000 feet of the pond that would harm the
salamanders.249 It is a significant waste of state funds and court time to
require the NYDEC to bring an action in court to carry out its function.
If the NYDEC were required to approve the EIS, or to have equal
authority with any lead agency proposing an action, then the project
241. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.3(b).
242. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.11(a).
243. Hell’s Kitchen Neighborhood Ass’n v. New York City Dep’t of City Planning, 6 Misc. 3d
1031(A), 2004 WL 3218419 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Sept. 21, 2004) (unpublished decision).
244. Id.
245. The New York version of NEPA presents another procedural hurdle for plaintiffs,
requiring that the plaintiff “demonstrate that they stand to suffer an injury that is environmental and
not solely economic in nature should the agency decision be upheld.” Wall Street Garage Parking
Corp. v. Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., 5 Misc. 3d 1027(A), 2004 WL 2889747 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County Nov. 3, 2004) (unpublished decision).
246. State v. White Oak Co., LLC, 787 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (2004).
247. Id. at 334.
248. Id. at 335.
249. Id. at 334.
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would have been curtailed without resort to the courts.
Where a town zoning board granted a variance for development of
a deer farm without preparation of an EIS, the court granted the
neighbors’ petition for annulment of the variance because the Town did
not adequately consider the environmental impact.250 This illustrates the
need for environmental agencies to be involved in the early phases of
assessment, in determinations of whether an EIS is required.
Although there is precedent in New York for the use of co-lead
agencies for completion of an EIS, there is no requirement that one of
the co-lead agencies be charged with protection of the environment or
natural resources.251 The New York State Department of Environmental
Protection was a co-lead agency with the Department of City Planning in
a case involving a rezoning and grant of special permits for a
development project.252 Although a neighborhood group challenged the
EIS, the court upheld the action.253 Similar to the deference shown to
federal agencies, New York state courts uphold agency decisions unless
they are found to be arbitrary and capricious.254 Where a New York
town did not prepare an EIS but merely a short form environmental
assessment before approving a subdivision that would expand wetlands,
the court denied petitioner’s allegations that the town did not effectively
consider the environmental impact.255 The court found that “the
Legislature has left the agencies with considerable latitude in
determining environmental impacts . . . .”256 The court further stated,
“experts and other interested agencies engaged in lengthy and
meaningful consideration” of the environmental impacts, therefore the
decision to not prepare an EIS was not arbitrary.257
V. LIMITATIONS ON JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
In United States v. LaSalle National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that inter–agency cooperation was proper, unless an agency either
exceeded its authority or interfered with another agency’s

250. Fleck v. Town of Colden, 792 N.Y.S. 2d 281, 284-85 (2005).
251. Id. (authorizing the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and City Planning Commission
as co-lead agencies, notwithstanding the requirement in N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §
617.6 (b) that there be a single lead agency).
252. Coalition Against Lincoln West v. City of New York, 86 N.Y. 2d 123, 129 (1995).
253. Id. at 128-29.
254. Ellsworth v. Town of Malta, 792 N.Y.S. 2d 227, 229 (2005).
255. Id. at 230.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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responsibilities.258 LaSalle involved two IRS summonses served upon a
bank and its vice president pursuant to a civil penalty investigation.259
The Department of Justice (DOJ) later commenced a criminal
prosecution against the bank and its employee.260 The court found that
the summonses were enforceable if issued by the IRS in good faith,
before the recommendation to the DOJ, and if the IRS did not abandon
the pursuit of civil tax collection.261 EPA involvement in preparing the
EA will not exceed EPA authority, because environmental protection is
the mandate of the EPA. Such enhanced involvement of the EPA will
not interfere with the lead agency’s responsibilities because all federal
agencies are responsible for minimizing environmental harm pursuant to
NEPA.
VI. PROBLEMS WITH DUAL AUTHORITY
The sharing of authority between government agencies is not
without problems. Additional communication between the EPA and the
lead agency will be necessary if the EPA has an enhanced NEPA role.
Arguably, such communications could leave a paper trail to assist
plaintiffs opposing the proposed agency action; however,
communication among agencies will not result in additional disclosures
to opposing parties because intra-agency communications and opinions
are protected from disclosure.262 Courts have held that the purpose of
this exemption is to foster and encourage cooperation among agencies
and discussions which would be inhibited if the results of those
discussions were disclosed.263 This issue should not be determinative in
enhancing the EPA’s role in NEPA.
If an agency duplicates the work of another agency, cost
inefficiencies will result. In addition to the duplicative costs of joint
authority, a failure to share information may result in undue burden on
the industry being regulated, and could result in more serious
consequences when important information fails to reach the party
capable of preventing harm. For example, the EPA reviews the herbicide

258. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 17, 1980 (General Dynamics Corp.,
Inc.), No. H-80-29, 1980 WL 1422 (D. Conn. May 19, 1980) (unpublished decision); United States
v. Lasalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 313-14 (1978).
259. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. at 301.
260. Id. at 313.
261. Id. at 318.
262. NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149-50 (1975); Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir.1980).
263. Sears Roebuck, 421 U.S. at 150-152.
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that will be applied to genetically modified plants, but the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), part of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, reviews the genetically modified herbicide-tolerant plants
themselves, and these two agencies do not coordinate their review.264
This type of inefficiency will need to be monitored and minimized if the
EPA’s role in the NEPA process is enhanced.
Dual authority can be most problematic where the two entities
having authority reach conflicting conclusions. For example, the
potential for transgenic cotton to cross with wild cotton in the United
States was studied by both the EPA and APHIS. APHIS concluded that
there was no significant expectation that the two varieties of cotton
would cross; whereas the EPA found that such a risk existed in southern
Florida, parts of Arizona, and Hawaii.265
A New Jersey case provides another example of inconsistent
conclusions between state agencies. The plaintiff casino operator
alleged that the state Department of Community Affairs (DCA)
construction safety regulations for casinos conflicted with the Casino
Control Commission’s (CCC) regulations.266 Noting the sensitivity of
the issue, the court declined to decide, instead remanding the issue back
to both agencies, stating “[i]f, or when, a true conflict emerges, we are
confident that the DCA and the CCC will coordinate regulation in the
overall public interest.”267 If the EPA role in NEPA is enhanced, such
coordination will be important.
Conflicting conclusions in the NEPA process could most
beneficially be addressed by allowing the EPA to require an EIS
overriding the lead agency’s issuance of a FONSI, thereby granting the
EPA greater authority than the lead at this stage in the process. After the
EIS is completed, the lead agency may have greater authority to
264. Council on Environmental Quality & Office of Science and Technology Policy, Case
Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean 49, at 17-18 (2001) (stating that although APHIS and
EPA are working on coordinating efforts, currently there are no formal exchanges between the two
agencies on this subject), available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study4.pdf (last visited
Oct. 25, 2005). See also Mandel, supra note 231 at 2241.
265. John H. Payne, USDA/APHIS Petition 97-013-01P for Determination of Nonregulated
Status for Events 31807 and 31808 Cotton: Environmental Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact (1997), available at http://www.agbios.com/docroot/decdocs/01-290-028.pdf
(last visited Oct. 25, 2005); Zigfridas Vaituzis, Doug, Gurian-Sherman, Chris Wozniak, Robyn
Rose, Gail Tomimatsu, & Mike Mendelson, EPA, BT Plant-Pesticides Biopesticides Registration
Action Document IIC10 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/oscpmont/sap/2000/october/brad3
_enviroassessment.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
266. Atlantic City Showboat, Inc. v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 751 A.2d 111, 112-13 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2000).
267. Id. at 112.
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determine which alternative action is best; however, the choice of an
alternative with predictable adverse environmental impact should be per
se arbitrary and capricious.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Author suggests that the courts should find any FONSI issued
by a federal agency pursuant to NEPA to be arbitrary and capricious if
the EPA has not expressly agreed with the determination. If courts
accorded the appropriate level of deference to lead agencies, recognizing
the lead agency’s lack of environmental expertise, and lack of incentive
to give priority to environmental concerns, an amendment to NEPA
would not be required. Because the courts currently use an “arbitrary and
capricious” standard, granting significant deference to lead agencies, an
amendment to NEPA may be required to give effect to the suggestions
herein.
At a minimum, the EPA and other environmental agencies such as
the FWS and NPS should be involved in the EA, and perhaps have
authority as co-lead agencies to prepare an EIS and decide whether the
project will proceed, or which alternative to choose. Although this
enhanced role of the EPA may require a corresponding increase in the
EPA budget, this change is necessary to make NEPA effective, and not
merely a procedural hurdle. Without these suggested changes, NEPA
creates a burden on regulated projects, requiring lengthy and expensive
preparation of EAs and EISs, without a corresponding positive impact
on environmental protection. Centralization of environmental analysis in
the EPA should result in greater accuracy and efficiency. Any potential
additional costs and bureaucracy of enhanced EPA involvement are
worth it to carry out the intent of NEPA.
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